III. The first appearance of Aetolian elite units
By chance, we owe to this traditional friendship between the Aetolians
and the Eleans one of the most important testimonies of the early
Aetolian confederacy. In the Book XIV of Library of History Diodorus
of Sicily recounts some episodes of the Spartan-Elean War that followed
the victory of Spartans in the Peloponnesian War (chapters 17.4-17.12).
Sparta after the defeat of Athens was unquestionable the leader in the
Greek world, and tried also to settle the Peloponnesian affairs after her
own plans. Elis found herself in a precarious situation, yet still was able to
find an ally in Aetolia. Despite provoking Sparta, which must have been
extremely risky in the circumstances of the time, in 402 the Aetolians
decided to send 1 000 picked or elite warriors (epilektoi) as an aid to the
Eleans37. In what follows I will argue that it is the terminus ante quem
of a military reform in Aetolia, which reform must be an element of
federalist transformation of the earlier tribal league.
Diod. 14, 17, 9: Ἠλεῖοι δὲ μικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἦσαν παρ’ Αἰτωλῶν
εἰληφότες συμμάχους ἐπιλέκτους ἄνδρας χιλίους, οἷς τὸν περὶ τὸ
γυμνάσιον τόπον δεδώκεισαν φυλάττειν. τοῦ δὲ Παυσανίου τοῦτον
37 It is also the very likely first occurrence of the term as an official name for a unit.
Admittedly, Diodorus describes in this way the Theban Sacred Band at Delium (Diod.
12, 70, 1) as well as some Athenian units (Diod. 11,30,4; 11,31,2; 12,79,1). In the
former case, however, it was not the actual name of the unit, whereas the latter case is
even more complex. Diodorus tends to describe as epilektoi various types of the elite
troops (including the Arcadian eparitoi, on which cf. below n. 40), still other authors
speak about fifth-century Athenian epilektoi (e.g. Aeschin., de fals. leg. 75.8; Paus.
1,29,8). Fifth-century authors (Herodotus, Thucydides) never mention epilektoi, and
invariably speak about logades, in the same sense. Therefore, I presume that the later
author’s use of epilektoi in regard of the elite units, of which we do know different
names, may be anachronistic; see: L. Tritle, Epilektoi at Athens, AHB 3 (1989) 54-59;
V. Alonso - K. Freitag, Prolegomena zu Erforschung der Bedeutung der Eliteeinheiten im
archaischen und klassischen Griechenland, Gerion 19 (2001), 199-219, esp. 206-208 and
216-217.
19
τὸν τόπον πρῶτον ἐπιχειρήσαντος πολιορκεῖν καταπεφρονηκότως, ὡς
οὐδέποτ’ ἂν τολμησάντων Ἠλείων ἐπεξελθεῖν, ἐξαίφνης οἵ τε Αἰτωλοὶ
καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐκχυθέντες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως κατεπλήξαντο
τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, καὶ σχεδὸν τριάκοντα αὐτῶν κατέβαλον.
”A short time before this the Eleans had got from the Aetolians
a thousand elite allied troops to help them, to whom they had given the
region about the gymnasion to guard. When Pausanias first of all started
to lay siege to this place, and in a careless manner, not supposing that the
Eleans would ever dare to make sortie against him, suddenly both the
Aetolians and many of the citizens, pouring forth from the city, struck
terror into the Lacedaemonians and slew some thirty of them.”
An incitement of fear38 in fearless Spartans and a subsequent butchery
of thirty of them in a sudden sortie, being a very achievement of this
unit, may suggest that the epilektoi were a well-trained hoplite force. This
contradicts, of course, a widespread opinion that the Aetolian military
was mostly light infantry. Let us note, however, that also in Classical
sources we see the same hiatus between generalizing statements about
the light-armed warfare of the Aetolians and the actual numbers and
types of Aetolian troops recorded by the ancient historians39 - the armies
fighting in the Lamian War or against the Celts were predominantly
hoplite or phalanx ones.
38 On this war see recently: J. Roy, The Spartan-Elean War of c. 400, Athenaeum 97
(2009), 69-86, 80. The verb κατεπλήξαντο used by Diodorus (or his source) fits well
into the conventional picture of a clash of phalanxes and their face-to-face combat, in
which losers are often frightened or shocked, see (with all natural weaknesses and limited
historicity of the face-of-the-battle approach) V.D. Hanson, The Western Way of
War. Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 22000, 96-104,
185-193.
39 Cf. below, p. 24-27.
20
IV. Hellenistic mobilisations
Admittedly, we cannot find a lot about the Aetolian epilektoi in
literary sources of the Hellenistic period, except for one single mention
in Polybius, which is non-technical: Polybius reports that the (hundred)
picked Aetolians were captured (οἱ μὲν ἐπίλεκτοι τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἑάλωσαν)
by Iason, an Antigonid garrison commander at Panopeus (Plb. 5,96,8).
A bit earlier, however, Polybius represents this army as a general
national levy brought together in order to attack Acarnania (Ἀγήτας ὁ
τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγὸς συναγαγὼν πανδημεὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς - Agetas, the
general of the Aetolians was gathering the Aetolians in full strength, Plb.
5,96,1). It seems that Agetas, having received a deceiving letter, switched
from Acarnania to Phocis with a part of the army at least. Then having
selected the hundred most suitable men, he sent them to the Acropolis (τοὺς
δ’ ἐπιτηδειοτάτους ἑκατὸν ἐπιλέξας ἀπέστειλε πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν, Plb. 5,96,6).
Accordingly, the hundred Aetolians captured at Panopeus were not
regular epilektoi, but an ad hoc unit40.
40 Sometimes it is not easy to distinguish between standing formations and ones
created ad hoc. Not a one improvised detachment may transform into or be replaced by
a permanent unit. The 300 epilektoi of Phlius may be a good example: – Xen., Hell.,
5,3,22 (300 men chosen by Delphion to strengthen Phlius’ resistance to Agesilaus in
381) and 7,2,10 and 12 (epilektoi well-established in the years 371-369). Although the
300 of Delphion waged war against Sparta and the later epilektoi fought for her, we
should notice that both episodes are parts of what we can call – after Christopher Tuplin
- the encomium of Phlius (and of her small, but valiant army). I would presume
that the interest in these two episodes might be borrowed by Xenophon from the Phleians
themselves. I would say, too, that there might be a one consistent tradition of
military prowess in this city, which saw the beginnings of the Phleian epilektoi in the
unit of Delphion and stressed the continuity of city’s development in spite of a change
of constitution and an escape of Delphion himself. On the encomium of Phlius, see:
C. Tuplin, Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.10 - 7.5.27, Wiesbaden
1993, 145 (Tuplin, however, refers to the stories told in Book VII only) and J.
Dillery, Xenophon and the History of His Times, London and New York 1995, 131-133
(who considers episodes from Books V and VII incompatible).
21
Yet, we can say with certainty that this force continued well into the
high Hellenistic Age, and still was basically divided into infantry units of
1 000 men. The survival of epilektoi into the era of great expansion of the
Confederacy finds the obvious confirmation in an Aetolian – Acarnanian
treaty of alliance and sympolity (IG IX 12 3a), which names seven
epilektarcheontes, so commanders of epilektoi. The document contains,
too, detailed military obligations of allies, probably the most complete
military provisos we can find in ancient Greek treaties of alliance. The
treaty was the bilateral pact, and provisos were fitted to the potential of
both sides, it is true. Since, however, the Aetolians seem to have been
a senior partner and originator of the alliance41, the obligations in case
of war, same for both sides, must have responded better to the Aetolian
military organisation.
ll. 26-41: συμμαχία Αἰτωλοῖς καὶ Ἀκαρνάνοις ἄματα τὸμ πάντα χρόνον.
εἴ τίς κα ἐμβάλληι εἰς τὰν Αἰτωλίαν ἐπὶ πολέμωι, βοαθοεῖν τοὺς
Ἀκαρνᾶνας πεζοῖς μὲν χιλίοις, ἱππεῦσι δὲ ἑκατόν, οὕς κα τοὶ ἄρχοντε-
ς πέμπωντι, ἐν ἁμέραις ἕξ. καὶ εἴ τις ἐν Ἀκαρνανίαν ἐμβάλλοι ἐπὶ πολέμωι,
βοαθοεῖν Αἰτωλοὺς πεζοῖς μὲν χιλίοις, ἱππέοις δὲ ἑκατὸν ἐν ἁμέραις ἕξ, οὕς
κα τοὶ ἄρχοντες πέμπωντι. εἰ δὲ πλειόνων χρείαν ἔχοιεν ἅτεροι πότεροι,
βοαθοούντω τρισχιλίοις ἑκάτεροι ἑκατέροις ἐν ἁμέραις δέκα. τᾶς δὲ βοαθοίας τ-
ᾶς ἀποστελλομένας ἔστω τὸ τρίτομ μέρος ὁπλῖται. πεμπόντω δὲ τὰμ βοάθοίαν
ἐγ μὲν Ἀκαρνανίας οἱ στραταγοὶ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων καὶ οἱ σύνεδροι, ἐγ δὲ Αἰτωλίας
οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν Αἰτωλῶν. σιταρχούντω δὲ τοὺς [ἀπ]οστελλομένους στρατιώτ-
ας ἑκάτεροι τοὺς αὐτῶν ἁμερᾶν τριάκοντ[α. εἰ δὲ πλεί]ονα χρόνον ἔχοιεν τᾶς βοα-
θοίας χρείαν οἱ μεταπεμψάμενοι τ[ὰμ βοάθοια]ν, διδόντω τὰς σιταρχίας, ἔστε κα
41 Olivier Dany speaks for the equality of contracting sides, and considers the treaty
as a success of the Acarnanians securing themselves against the famous Aetolian
greed, see: O. Dany, Akarnanien im Hellenismus. Geschichte und Völkerrecht in Nordwestgriechenland,
München 1999, 85-86. I think that the treaty was a transitional success
of the Aetolians, who tried to extend their protectorate over whole of Acarnania,
and then to annex the country peacefully. First after a failure of this plan the Confederacy
decided for a partition of the Acarnanian territory with Epirus (Plb. 2,45,1;
9,34,7).
22
ἐν οἶκον ἀποστείλωντι τοὺς [στρατιώ]τας. σιταρχία δ’ ἔστω τοῦ πλείονος
χρόνου τῶ[ι ἱππεῖ στα]τὴρ Κορίν[θιος τᾶς] ἁμέρας ἑκάστας, τῶι δ̣ὲ̣ τὰμ
πανοπλίαν ἔχο[ντι δύο δραχμαί], τῶι δὲ τὸ̣ [ἡ̣μιθωρ]άκιον ἐννέ’ ὀβολοί, ψιλῶ̣ι
ἕπτ’ ὀβολοί. ἁγείσθων [δὲ ἐμ μὲν Αἰτω]λ̣ί<α>ι οἱ Αἰ[τωλο]ί̣, ἐν δὲ Ἀκ̣αρνανίαι οἱ
Ἀκαρν̣ᾶνε̣[ς ....]
“If someone comes against Aetolia for the purpose of war the
Acarnanians will assist them with one thousand infantrymen and one
hundred cavalrymen which the magistrates will send within six days, and
if someone comes against Acarnania for the purpose of war the Aetolians
will assist them with one thousand infantrymen and one hundred
cavalrymen which the magistrates, too, will send within six days. If
either have a need of more, let the other assist with three thousand, each
to the other, within ten days. The aid dispatched will be in the third part
hoplites. The strategoi and synedrion of the Acarnanians will send for
the aid from Acarnania and the archontes of the Aetolians from Aetolia.
Let those of the dispatched expedition be provisioned by senders, each
of them for thirty days. If the aid is needed for a greater time, let those
who sent for the aid give provisions, until such time as the force shall be
sent home. If the provisions are needed for a greater time [a cavalryman]
shall receive one Corinthian stater each day, a heavy infantryman [two
drachmae]’, a light infantryman nine obols, a skirmisher – seven obols.
The commanders will be [in Aeto]lia the Aetolians and in Acarnania the
Acarnanians [...]”.
Certainly, the exactness of stipulations was to exclude freedom
of interpretation. The alliance did not survive too long, since the
Acarnanians must have realized how dangerous to them it was. We do
not know whether the treaty was ever implemented, and thus, we cannot
say whether the meticulousness of the treaty’s negotiators could save
the momentary allies from procedural misunderstandings. As already
said, the treaty provides us with invaluable data on the composition of
Greek armies in the Hellenistic age. Still, it is widely misunderstood.
23
Alongside a stress on the treaty’s payment clauses the scholarly attention
focuses on a demand to send the expeditionary army being in one third
hoplite force. The obligation to send a contingent consisting in one
third of the hoplites is often taken as a proof that the Aetolian army
was predominantly a light force; and that the Aetolian tactics can be
understood as different from the polis model. Such a view bases partly
on an assumption that Aetolia was a backwater with no major urban
centers. Now we can safely say that Aetolia’s urbanisation began earlier
than we used to believe, and that the polis was the basic unit of political
organisation of the country. Hence, it seems to me disputable whether
the Aetolian army from late Classical period onwards was lighterarmed
than most contemporary Greek armies. I would rather think
that the clause defining a minimum share of hoplites was intended to
assure a participation of the elite units in the expeditionary forces. This
interpretation finds support in the extraordinary inclusion of the names
of seven treasurers (tamieuontes) and seven elitemen’s commanders
(epilektarcheontes) in the treaty. Both magistratures rarely appear in the
Aetolian documents. Their equal number clearly indicates that there was
a close relation between the elite units and the state’s treasury: in 260s
the Aetolian epilektoi were recruited in seven districts, and were paid
for their service by seven financial officials based in these districts. In
this respect, the Aetolian Confederacy resembles better-known Greek
federal states, in which the military was based on elite, semi-professional
warriors. An army of this type could be a heavy burden for public
finances, yet it was an irreplaceable tool of government and politics in
the Greek federal states reorganised during the fourth century B.C. – the
Arcadian eparitoi numbering 5 000 foot and loosely classified as epilektoi
are perhaps the best known example42.
42 The name of eparitoi recurs in Xenophon (Xen., Hell. 7,4,22; 7,4,33-4; 7,4,36;
7,5,3) it was also known to Ephorus (FGrHist 70 F 215), but was completely misunderstood
as a subtribe’s name or city ethnic in Aelius Herodianus (De prosodia catholica
3.1. p. 76, l. 27) and Stephanus of Byzantium, s.v. Ἐπαρίται (ἔθνος Ἀρκαδίας). The
24
The eparitoi were considered as a highly efficient instrument of war,
although their number was small in comparison with armies raised by
fifth-century intermediate powers in Greece. It would be interesting,
therefore to compare with them the Aetolian epilektoi to assess the
military potential of the freshly rearranged Confederacy.
We do not have any data on the Aetolian armies of the Classical period.
For the first time, our sources specify the numbers of Aetolian forces used
during the Lamian war. These numbers confirm our guess that 1 000
epilektoi were mustered by one of the seven districts of the Confederacy,
moreover this conclusion is valid not only for the third century, but also
for the 320s. Thus, during the crisis of 322 the Aetolians sent 7 000 of
probably hoplite43 infantry to face the Macedonians at Thermopylae
(Diod. 18,9,5). In the same way, the heavy infantry numbering 7 000
men was sent in 279/8 to Thermopylae to face a Celtic invasion (Paus.
10, 20, 4). Pausanias, who underscores that the Aetolian contingent was
also the biggest of all Greek armies fighting Celts, seems to have done
his best to give as many details as possible, but felt obliged to confess his
inability to provide exact data:
high value of eparitoi in Hesychios, s.v. (ἐπάριτοι>· τάγμα Ἀρκαδικὸν μαχιμώτατον). The
number of eparitoi and their alternative name – Diod. 15,62,2 and 15,67,2. The older
theories that the Arcadian constitution was written by the Thebans or answered the
Platonic ideal of the state are rejected nowadays, rather one stresses lack of wise alternatives
to the solutions accepted by the Arcadians in 370; see: K. Trampedach, Platon, die
Akademie und die zietgenössische Politik, Stuttgart 1994, 34-36. Trampedach is highly
convincing in rejection of direct stimuli from Thebes or Academy, and his argument
(with right on his side) does not exclude possible borrowings and inspirations from
other efficient systems.
43 In the precedent sentence of chapter 18,9,5 Diodorus stresses that Leosthenes’
Athenian contingent was all hoplite (even if a significant part of his soldiers got their
armours from the Athenian state only recently – this is also underscored by the historian).
Since Diodorus does not say anything about a composition of the Aetolian contingent,
it is likely that the latter consisted of regular hoplites.
25
Αἰτωλῶν δὲ πλείστη τε ἐγένετο στρατιὰ καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν μάχης ἰδέαν, ἡ
μὲν ἵππος οὐ λέγουσιν ὁπόση, ψιλοὶ δὲ ἐνενήκοντα καὶ <ἑπτακόσιοι, πλέονες
δὲ> ἑπτακισχιλίων ἀριθμὸν ἦσαν οἱ ὁπλιτεύοντες.
“An army of the Aetolians was the greatest and provided with all
arms. One does not report the number of horse, but there were 790?
skirmishers and more than 7000 in number served as hoplites”.
The text is corrupted, restored by Schubarth (his correction was
rejected in the most recent Teubner’s Pausanias by Rocha-Pereira), so
we cannot be certain of the number of light troops, but the size of heavy
infantry is certain. Pausanias, however, refers to the Aetolian heavy
infantry as ὁπλιτεύοντες “acting as hoplites”, not mere hoplites. The
participle used here to describe the Aetolian infantry is rather rare in
the Greek literature, still quite often in Pausanias, who may have used
this form for stylistic reasons. It is also attractive that the participle was
used with an intention to stress that the Aetolian seven thousand were
a flexible force of professional warriors able to fight as hoplites or as light
infantry (the verb ὁπλιτεύω may be juxtaposed with other verbs denoting
service in cavalry, light forces or fleet44 or just contrasted with inability
to fight45).
As I have already pointed out, the Aetolian forces gathered after the
first, quick and restricted mobilisations were much bigger. Thus, during
a Macedonian invasion of Aetolia in 322 the Confederacy mustered
10 000 warriors, and those being not a whole levy, but actually men
“flourishing by youth” (Diod. 18,24,2: ἀκμάζοντας). The two passages in
Diodorus concerning the Aetolian manpower during the Lamian War
allow a conclusion that the epilektoi (7 000 of them) were generally
a group narrower than the “flourishing by youth” (most likely young men
under 30). The next logical conclusion is that at the time of the Lamian
44 Thuc. 8,73,4; Ps.-Lysias, Pro Polystrato 25.
45 Paus. 10,22,6.
26
War the epilektoi were probably a selection from (actually, a majority of )
all Aetolians in their twenties46.
Slightly afterwards the Aetolians were able to have 12 000 infantry
and 400 cavalry to invade Amphissa and Thessaly (Diod. 18,38,1), but
one should underscore that in the early phase of any conflict the Aetolians
were unable or unwilling to send quickly a greater army. The greatest
recorded number of the Aetolian troops is more than 20 000 foot and
no less than 1 000 horse, ready to join Polyperchon against Cassander
in 310 (Diod. 20,20,3)47. Modern scholars tend to take literally the
latter passage and to think that these numbers were impossible without
many individual foreigners having entered the Aetolian ranks or simply
without allied foreign units having been attached to the bulk of the
Aetolian troops, and an extreme proposal was made that the army of
12 000 foot and no less than 400 cavalry, which invaded Amphissa
and Thessaly in 322/1, was not purely Aetolian, either48. The former is
– admittedly – not unlikely49, yet the latter seems totally excluded. An
46 The Neocretans are now proved to be elite units of the Cretan youth, see: N.V.
Sekunda, Neocretans, in S. Crouzet - J.-C. Couvenhes (eds.), Pratiques et identities
culturelles des armées hellénistiques du monde méditerranéen. Actes du colloque de Tours,
23-24 mars 2007, Paris – Tours, in print.
47 προθύμως θ’ ὑπακουόντων τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ πολλῶν ἄλλων συντρεχόντων ἐπὶ τὴν
κάθοδον τοῦ βασιλέως οἱ σύμπαντες ἠθροίσθησαν πεζοὶ μὲν ὑπὲρ τοὺς δισμυρίους, ἱππεῖς
δ’ οὐκ ἐλάττους χιλίων - “Since the Aetolians willigly listened to Polzperchon’s appeal and
many other joined in order to re-establish the king, there were in all assembled more than
twenty thousand infantry and at least one thousand horsemen”.
48 It is implied by whether omission of this event in K.-J. Beloch, Die Bevölkerung
der griechisch-römischen Welt, Leipzig 1886, 186-187 or by a simple ascribing all these
forces to Polyperchon (e.g. R. Billows, Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the
Hellenistic State, Berkeley-Los Angeles 1992, 140-141); explicitly, it is not stated anywhere,
but in J.D. Grainger, The League of the Aitolians, 203. The latter does not believe
in the purely Aetolian character of the army that invaded Amphissa and Thessaly in
321, either.
49 On the other hand, we should note an overrepresentation of cavalry in the army
that supported Polyperchon. Perhaps, there were more people of high social status able
27
army entrusted to the general Alexander was precisely four times as big
as contingents, which the Aetolians were to send to the Acarnanians in
fulfillment of the treaty of IG IX 12 1, 3. Apparently, in the treaty the
Aetolians obliged themselves to send a whole contingent of one unit
(consisting of 1 000 epilektoi, 2 000 other foot, 100 cavalry), and in 321
they mustered for an action in Locris and Thessaly four of the seven
districts of the Confederacy existing at that time (12 000 infantry and
400 cavalry).
If the above considerations are true, it has to be asked whether the
Aetolians in the period of the league’s expansion in the third century did
not create new districts. Thomas Corsten has made an intelligent plea
against this idea, and shown that the districts were enlarged following
the conquests, no one, however, can overcome easily a problem of the
Stratian district known due to its arbitration between Oeniadae and
Matropolis (IG IX 12 1, 3b)50. Moreover, boularchoi, being most likely
the chief representatives of the districts in the federal council, cease to
act as eponymous officials recorded in the Aetolian inscriptions in midthird
century. On the one hand, this change might be ascribed to the
growth of districts’ number, and the following erosion of the district
division within the council. On the other hand, the quick enlargement
of already existing districts (through the addition of new and – as
Corsten suggests - diverse territories) may have the same effect, the units
to serve as cavalrymen among guest friends of the Aetolian Confederacy who joined
this army (e.g. exiled Thessalian aristocrats, many of them must have been based in
Aetolia or Delphi, and sided with the Confederacy). A contrast between the Companion
Cavalry and the Companion Infantry of the Macedonian kings may be an analogy,
whereas the footmen were all considered – irrespective of their true ethnic origin-
Macedonians, many of the Horse Companions remained foreigners to the Macedonian
commonwealth, cf. J. Rzepka, Monarchia macedońska. Zgromadzenie i obywatelstwo
u schyłku epoki klasycznej i w okresie hellenistycznym [in Polish: The Macedonian Monarchy:
the Assembly and the Citizenship in Late Classical and Hellenistic Periods], Warszawa
2006, 48-63.
50 T. Corsten, Vom Stamm zum Bund, 153-157.
28
that were originally quite consistent, lost a lot of their initial homogeny,
and in consequence – their importance in the policy-making of the
Confederacy. Likewise, Corsten’s argument that the number of districts
remained unaltered, and only their names changed is ingenious indeed.
Still, it cannot be excluded that the non-Aetolian names of the districts51
were introduced in the very beginning, and as the names of military
units they originally underscored the frontiers, which the districts forces
were initially designed to defend. I believe that six days for sending the
first epilektoi section of allied help in IG IX 12 1, 3 (an unduly long
time, indeed52) may reflect the fact that in 260s the districts were not
any longer cohesive territorial entities, and people from more remote
poleis needed more time to join their units. Also the fact that in 322 no
more than two third of the Aetolian youth were mustered as epilektoi
seems to indicate that the initial number of districts at the time of the
system’s creation was seven – originally almost all young men between
20 and 30 were intended to serve as the Confederacy’s semi-professional
warriors.
Our evidence on Aetolian armies in the high Hellenistic Age is
surprisingly scarce. Polybius does not say a lot about the Aetolian
potential (perhaps he was unwilling to do so because of his enmity
towards the Aetolians53). He and other authors, partly depending on
him, do not have overall numbers, they occasionally give sizes of some
51 Alongside with Stratian district known due to IG IX 12 1, 3b (from late 230s),
there was also the Locrian district recorded in SGDI 2070 and 2139 (both from the
year 189/8); on these regions and their composition covering mixed areas (the only
known by name boularchos of the Locrian district came from Agrinion in the heart of
historical Aetolia), see T. Corsten, Vom Stamm zum Bund, 148-152.
52 The Aetolian epilektoi as elite troops were certainly easy to gather and equally
easy to dispatch. Thus, six days for gathering a unit of epilektoi would certainly have
been superfluous if an average district had covered one seventh of the Aetolian territory
(roughly 15 000 square kilometer in the peak of the Confederacy’s successes), i.e.
ca. 2 000 square kilometer.
53 See n. 9.
29
units and contingents, which confirm our preliminary conclusions
concerning the size, the structure, and the age character of elite forces.
The strongest indication that the epilektoi survived with major features
as number, units, a way of recruitment unchanged until the second
century is provided by Livy, who not without Schadenfreude inherited
from Polybius, his chief authority on Greek affairs, gives an account of
a manpower shortage in Aetolia ascribed to the notorious greed of the
people.
Liv. 31,43,5-7: Scopas princeps gentis ab Alexandrea magno cum
pondere auri ab rege Ptolomaeo missus sex milia peditum et quingentos
equites mercede conductos Aegyptum auexit; nec ex iuuentute Aetolorum
quemquam reliquisset, ni Damocritus nunc belli quod instaret, nunc futurae
solitudinis admonens, incertum cura gentis an ut aduersaretur Scopae
parum donis cultus, partem iuniorum castigando domi continuisset.
“Scopas a prominent man among the tribe, sent by King Ptolemy
from Alexandria with a great quantity of gold, had transported to Egypt
six thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry whom he had hired; nor
would he have left a single fighting-man of the Aetolians, if Damocritus,
now warning them of the present war, now of the future depopulation
of the state, had not by his reproofs kept at home a part of the younger
men, though it is uncertain whether his action was due to concern for
the state or a desire to thwart Scopas, who had not been generous with
gifts to him.”
Livy’s 6 000 foot and 500 cavalry that chose the Ptolemaic service
belong to the age group classified as iuventus or iuniores. In the Roman
military language both terms refer to the young people under arms,
expected to fight heroically, but at the same time less disciplined54.
Livy’s iuniores must have been epilektoi. Finally, Livy’s general estimate
of the proportions between a major part of iuniores enrolled in the
54 J.-P. Morel, Sur quelques aspects de la jeunesse à Rome, in: Mélanges offerts à
Jacques Heurgon: L’Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine, Roma 1976, 663-683,
esp. 674-681.
30
Ptolemaic army and those, who stayed home, fits well into the general
reconstructions of the Aetolian elite forces and manpower.
It should not be overlooked that the organisation of the Aetolian
epilektoi forces bears resemblances to the numbers known from the
fifth-century Boeotian Confederacy. In the latter each of eleven districts
at least theoretically mustered 1 000 heavy infantry and 100 cavalry
(Hell. Oxy. 16,4). It is tempting to assume that the Aetolians adopted
(or rather adapted) the Boeotian military arrangements, which must
have seemed especially attractive after the battle of Delium. Moreover,
Boeotia was a more natural pattern to follow for a Greek ethnos than
any polis (including Athens) could be55. The number of districts in
fifth-century Boeotia indicates, however, that the federal infantry was
not an elite arm, but rather based on a system of broader conscription,
similar to the Athenian one. According to the above reconstruction an
Aetolian innovation would be basically a division of citizen forces into
three groups: the elite infantry, the remaining infantry, and the cavalry.
The latter was generally considered an elite arm, and was expected
to be one tenth of the whole infantry of a Greek state. The Aetolian
innovation that reduced a postulated number of horsemen, hardly
achievable in Greek conditions out of Thessaly, was a realistic solution
to the horsepower shortages. Let us note that the Boeotian Confederacy
re-created in the fourth century was based on the reduced number of
districts (now seven of them) – since there is no sign of a dramatic
collapse of Boeotian manpower (infantry) and wealth (horse), it must
be understood as a clear sign of a shift towards the well-trained, semiprofessional
military. If the above considerations are accurate, it may be
an irony of history that the Aetolian military and federal reform of the
55 It is likely, too, that the earlier Boeotian arrangements could be attractive for
a big polis, and were a source of inspiration (one of numerous sources, that is true) for
an Athenian reformer Cleisthenes; see: P. Siewert, Die Drittelgliederung der elf Boiotischen
militärdistrike im Vergeleich mit der Kleisthenischen Trittyenordnung Attikas,
in: La Béotie antique, Paris 1985, 297-300.
31
late fifth century, itself modeled on the successful Boeotian example,
inspired the Boeotian reformers, who organised the new Confederacy,
which for a while gained hegemony in Greece.
32
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